Medicolegal
Father fails in attempt to stop girlfriend's abortion CLARE DYER On Tuesday of last week the Court of Appeal turned down an Oxford student's request for an injunction to stop his pregnant former girlfriend from going ahead with a planned abortion. Some five hours later three law lords rejected his application for a hearing by the House of Lords. The case, which went before a High Court judge only late in the preceding week and was in the Court ofAppeal within an hour of the High Court judgment on Monday, shows how fast the courts can move if the situation is sufficiently urgent; the girl, a 21 year old student also at Oxford, was booked for her termination two days later.
Not the first time
This is not the first time that the question ofa father's right to veto an abortion has come before the courts. In Paton v the trustees of the British Pregnancy Advisory Service in 1978 Sir George Baker held that a husband had no right to stop his wife having an abortion. But in that Paton case there was no suggestion that the abortion was unlawful. In the Oxford case the father was arguing that the abortion would amount to child destruction contrary to the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, and he applied for an injunction to restrain this threatened criminal act.
The father, Mr C, brought the action in his own right and also on behalf of the child. Whether he had any legal standing to do so and whether the child was a person with legal rights capable of protection by English law were issues that, in the event, the appeal judges were never called to rule on, committed "by any person who, with intent to destroy the life of a child capable of being born alive, by any wilful act causes a child to die before it has an existence independent of its mother." There is a presumption in the act that a child is capable of being born alive after the 28th week of pregnancy; but this does not imply that an infant of less than 28 weeks' gestation is considered to be incapable of being born alive.
In this case it was agreed that the act of intercourse that led to conception had taken place on 17 October, 18 weeks before the case reached court. Counsel for the father (Gerard Wright QC, who acted for Victoria Gillick in her attempt to stop doctors prescribing the contraceptive pill to girls under 16 without their parents' consent) argued that a fetus of this gestation (around 20 weeks, counting from the last menstrual period) would be born alive as its heart would be beating and it would have real and discernible signs of life. He conceded that it was dying and that it would die but submitted that at the time of birth it was alive. He pointed out that a baby born with those characteristics was not stillborn and had to be registered as liveborn under legislation governing the registration of births and deaths. Only by ruling that a child born with those attributes was alive could the court reconcile a conflict between two contemporaneous acts of parliament (the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 and the 1926 legislation on birth and death registration) using virtually the same language.
Health authority insists on a ruling from the House of Lords
Before the court's ruling on this point Mr Peter Sheridan QC, counsel for the mother, Miss S, told the court that Oxfordshire Health Authority (also a defendant, although it took no part in the proceedings) would not carry out the abortion as long as there was any possibility of an appeal to the House of Lords.
Giving judgment, the Master ofthe Rolls said that the mother had taken the "morning after pill" and later, not realising that she was still pregnant, had taken antidepressants and twice had x ray films taken for a chest infection, once without any shielding. All these things could have damaged the fetus. On the question of the key words "capable of being born alive," the court had read affidavit evidence from two doctors, neither of whom had examined Miss S. They agreed that the fetus if delivered by hysterotomy would be incapable ever of breathing. Where the doctors disagreed was whether the fetus could properly be described as capable of being born alive. That was a matter of interpretation of statute and a matter for the court. There was no evidence about the fetus carried by Miss S, but ifit had reached the normal stage ofdevelopment and was incapable of breathing it was not a child capable of being born alive.
His Lordship said that all three appeal court judges were astonished at the attitude of the health authority. Some 1000 appeals were heard by the Court of Appeal every year, of which only about 50 went to the House of Lords. In practical terms the Court of Appeal was the final court of appeal and must always be so. In no circumstances could anyone ever be blamed, much less charged with a criminal offence, for acting on the judgment of the Court of Appeal. If that were not so the life of the country would grind to a halt.
After consultation with counsel and assurances from Mr Wright that his instructions were to proceed to the House of Lords as expeditiously as possible their Lordships dismissed the appeal and refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords, which left the way clear for Mr Wright to apply to the law lords for leave to appeal. (A litigant has an automatic right to appeal to the Court of Appeal but can go on to the House of Lords only if either the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords itself gives permission; the case must involve a point of law of public importance.) Later that afternoon three law lords heard the application and refused leave, agreeing with the appeal court judges' view that a fetus that was so underdeveloped that, if separated from its mother, it would be unable to breathe either naturally or through a ventilator was not capable of being born alive.
What does it mean?
The effect of the Court of Appeal's ruling is to equate "capable of being born alive" in the Infant Life (Preservation) Act with viability. The reference in parentheses in the Abortion Act to the protection of viable fetuses shows that this was parliament's understanding of the meaning of the words. The question remains: When does a fetus become viable? The Bishop of Birmingham's unsuccessful bill would have reduced the 28 week period to 24 weeks. But even without this change 28 weeks is not a limit in the sense that doctors who perform abortions at, say, 26 weeks are automatically protected. As the act puts it, "evidence that a woman had at any material time been pregnant for a period of 28 weeks or more shall be prima facie proof that she was at that time pregnant of a child capable of being born alive." Does viability mean viability with the aid of intensive care or, as some argue, the ability to survive without intensive care?
Is it safe to prescribe a long term course (12-18 months) ofgriseofulvin (I g daily) for tinea ungram (positive culture to trichophyton rubrin) to ayoung woman who has been taking the pill for four years-since both have been linked with liver tumours?
Oral contraceptive steroids have been associated with an increased risk of hepatomas. The risk is definite but the absolute incidence remains lowabout 1-2 per 100 000 user years. A recent report suggests that malignant tumours of the liver may occur but these are even less common.
I Reports of hepatitis and cholestasis in patients taking griseofulvin have appeared but a causal relation has not been established. Hepatomas have not been described in man, although there is a report that long term administration of griseofulvin is associated with hepatomas in mice.2 The relevance of this finding to man is still in doubt. I would be more concerned that long term griseofulvin treatment, by induction of liver microsomal enzymes, will reduce the efficacy of the pill in this young woman.3 Almost certainly menstrual irregularities will occur in her when griseofulvin is started. Contraceptive efficacy, however, may be restored by using a higher dose preparation (containing 50 ,ug ethinyloestradiol) for as long as she takes griseofulvin.-MICHAEL ORME, professor of clinical pharmacology, Liverpool. Is there any viable oral treatmentfor preventing whooping cough in infants?
A homoeopathic preparation (Pertussin-30) is used by practitioners of alternative medicine with the intent of protecting against whooping cough. It is prepared from the sputum of a patient with pertussis which is serially diluted (in 100, 30 times). Given by mouth homoeopathic practice requires it to be given on a continuing basis as long as a child might be at risk from the disease, which in a country where whooping cough is endemic would mean throughout childhood. Though there is no reason to suspect that Pertussin might be dangerous, it has not been subject to the testing required of a conventional vaccine. There is no evidence that it is effective. A single limited trial found no additional protection for children who were given the preparation compared with those who were not.' Outside homoeopathic beliefs there is no theoretical basis on which the preparation could work. Any pertussis organisms remaining after the dilutions would be destroyed in the child's intestines. Children with suspected or proved whooping cough should be given a short course ofantibiotics, such as erythromycin for seven days, to ensure that they are non-infectious to others. 
